Theme 13 of 43
Migration, Urbanization & Spatial Transformation
Between the 2010 and 2022 Censuses, 43% of municipalities lost residents, nine state capitals shrank, and the fastest growth went to Roraima, Santa Catarina and the Center-West agricultural frontier — not São Paulo.
IBGE's 2010 and 2022 Demographic Censuses count every resident of every municipality — comparing the two is the most reliable picture of where Brazilians moved. CAGED, the Ministry of Labor's General Registry of Employed and Unemployed Workers, records every formal employment movement in the country — hires and layoffs, month by month, by municipality. Crossed with ANATEL's Brazilian Connectivity Index, the panel shows not only where Brazilian workers move to, but also what kind of infrastructure awaits them when they arrive. The picture that emerges is of a country with two simultaneous movements: accelerated concentration in a few metropolitan hubs and the emptying-out of the interior and the countryside.
2022 Census: Brazil grew toward the Center-West, the South and Roraima
Between the 2010 and 2022 Censuses the country's population grew 6.5%, from 190.8 to 203.1 million. Growth did not go to São Paulo, which stayed near the average (7.6%), but to the agricultural frontier and the South: Santa Catarina grew 21.8%, Mato Grosso 20.5%, Goiás 17.5%. Roraima, the gateway for Venezuelan migration, grew 41%. At the other end, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Alagoas were practically flat — under 1% in twelve years, which means a net loss of residents to other states.
| State | 2010 | 2022 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roraima | 450,479 | 636,707 | +41.3% |
| Santa Catarina | 6,248,436 | 7,610,361 | +21.8% |
| Mato Grosso | 3,035,122 | 3,658,649 | +20.5% |
| Goiás | 6,003,788 | 7,056,495 | +17.5% |
| São Paulo | 41,262,199 | 44,411,238 | +7.6% |
| Bahia | 14,016,906 | 14,141,626 | +0.9% |
| Rio de Janeiro | 15,989,929 | 16,055,174 | +0.4% |
| Alagoas | 3,120,494 | 3,127,683 | +0.2% |
| Brazil | 190,755,799 | 203,080,756 | +6.5% |
Santa Catarina grew 22% in twelve years and Rio de Janeiro 0.4% — the magnet of internal migration left the Southeast and moved to the South and Center-West.
Return migration: more promise than reality
CAGED's movement data show a continuous flow toward São Paulo, with no consistent signal of workers returning to their home states after a period in the metropolitan region. The narrative that migrants "go back home" after accumulating experience and capital in the metropolis finds no support in formal employment movement records.
The ones who migrate are the most qualified
Comparing migrants' average education level with the average in their place of origin, migrants consistently rank above the local average. The pattern is one of positive selection: it isn't just any worker who leaves, it's the most qualified worker — which worsens, rather than eases, regional inequality, because the region of origin loses precisely the human capital that could most contribute to its own development.
| Indicator | Observation |
|---|---|
| Migrants' education level | Above local average |
| Selection | Positive |
Poor regions lose precisely their most qualified workers — migration functions as a suction pump for human capital.
Census: almost half of municipalities lost people
Comparing the two Censuses, 2,393 of the 5,565 municipalities that existed in 2010 — 43% — had fewer residents in 2022. The loss is concentrated among small ones: more than half of municipalities under 5 thousand inhabitants shrank. Medium cities, from 100 thousand to 500 thousand inhabitants, grew the most (+11.9%). And large cities, above 500 thousand, grew only 2.5% as a group — 12 of them lost population.
| Size in 2010 | Municipalities | Lost population | % that lost | Group growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under 5 thousand | 1,301 | 697 | 53.6% | +0.4% |
| 5 to 20 thousand | 2,613 | 1,220 | 46.7% | +3.0% |
| 20 to 100 thousand | 1,368 | 433 | 31.7% | +7.9% |
| 100 to 500 thousand | 245 | 31 | 12.7% | +11.9% |
| 500 thousand or more | 38 | 12 | 31.6% | +2.5% |
| Total | 5,565 | 2,393 | 43.0% | +6.4% |
More than half of municipalities under 5 thousand inhabitants shrank between the Censuses — and the winner was the medium-sized city, not the metropolis.
The capitals that shrank
Nine state capitals had fewer residents in 2022 than in 2010. Salvador lost 9.6% (258 thousand people), Belém and Natal 6.5%, Porto Alegre 5.4%, and even Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte shrank. People did not leave the metropolitan regions: they moved to neighboring municipalities, where housing is cheaper. Frontier capitals, meanwhile, grew fast — Boa Vista 45%, Palmas 33%, Florianópolis 28%.
| Capital | 2010 | 2022 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salvador | 2,675,656 | 2,417,678 | −9.6% |
| Belém | 1,393,399 | 1,303,403 | −6.5% |
| Natal | 803,739 | 751,300 | −6.5% |
| Porto Alegre | 1,409,351 | 1,332,845 | −5.4% |
| Recife | 1,537,704 | 1,488,920 | −3.2% |
| Belo Horizonte | 2,375,151 | 2,315,560 | −2.5% |
| Rio de Janeiro | 6,320,446 | 6,211,223 | −1.7% |
| São Paulo | 11,253,503 | 11,451,999 | +1.8% |
| Florianópolis | 421,240 | 537,211 | +27.5% |
| Palmas | 228,332 | 302,692 | +32.6% |
| Boa Vista | 284,313 | 413,486 | +45.4% |
Salvador lost one in ten residents between the Censuses — the big capital stopped being a destination and became a point of departure for the metropolitan periphery.
International migration: a brain drain out of the country
About 3.4 million Brazilians live abroad today. The United States holds the largest contingent, with 1.8 million, followed by Portugal (800,000), Paraguay (500,000), and the United Kingdom (300,000). Far from being just extended tourism or retirement abroad, the flow carries a significant component of qualified workers seeking opportunities the Brazilian market doesn't offer.
| Destination | Brazilians |
|---|---|
| USA | 1.8 million |
| Portugal | 800,000 |
| Paraguay | 500,000 |
| United Kingdom | 300,000 |
3.4 million Brazilians live outside the country — a brain drain that adds to, and resembles, the same positive selection observed in internal migration.
Who stays and who leaves, according to the Continuous PNAD
Migrants average 28 years of age against 38 for those who stay; 11 years of education against 8; income of 3.5 minimum wages against 2.1; and a formality rate of 55% against 42%. The pattern repeats at every scale of the Brazilian migration phenomenon, whether internal or international: those who leave are younger, more educated, and hold more formal jobs — a success-selected slice that worsens the inequality between those who leave and those who stay.
| Indicator | Migrated | Stayed |
|---|---|---|
| Average age | 28 years | 38 years |
| Education | 11 years | 8 years |
| Income | 3.5 MW | 2.1 MW |
| Formality | 55% | 42% |
Those who migrate are younger, more educated, and more formally employed than those who stay — a success selection bias that repeats at every scale of the Brazilian migration phenomenon.
Powerful cross-references
- Migration × frontier: between 2010 and 2022, SC grew 21.8%, MT 20.5% and RR 41%, against 7.6% in SP and 0.4% in RJ.
- Selection × development: poor regions lose precisely their most qualified talent.
- Gender × migration: women migrate more into service occupations, a feminized sector of the labor market.
- Metropolis × periphery: nine capitals lost population between the Censuses; Salvador lost 9.6%.
- Rural × exodus: 28 million people in rural areas, a population in constant decline.
- International × brain drain: 3.4 million Brazilians live outside the country.
- Profile × selection: those who migrate are younger, more educated, and more formally employed.
- Small town × emptying: 53.6% of municipalities under 5 thousand inhabitants shrank between 2010 and 2022.
Explanatory hypotheses
The cumulative-advantage hypothesis explains the movement observed: already-rich regions attract more investment, which generates more jobs, which attracts more qualified people — a self-reinforcing cycle. Brain-drain theory explains why peripheral regions systematically lose their most capable workers, both through internal and international migration. The gender breakdown shows that women migrate proportionally more into service occupations and domestic work, historically feminized sectors of the labor market. And the scale of the international talent drain suggests that Brazil today cannot offer sufficient conditions to retain a significant share of its most qualified workforce.
Policy implications
Economic deconcentration policies could reduce migratory pressure toward the Southeast's three major metros. Investment directed at the interior tends to retain local talent instead of pushing it toward metropolitan hubs. Mid-sized cities, in the 500,000 to 1 million resident range, could function as alternative regional development hubs, redistributing population without further overloading the capitals. Retention programs for scientists and researchers at interior universities could reduce part of the brain drain. And remote work, as a tool for decentralization, could let qualified workers stay outside major centers without giving up professional opportunity.