Theme 06 of 43

Crime, Violence & Public Security

Eight in ten firearm deaths in Brazil are Black or mixed-race people, and the homicide rate for Black Brazilians is 2.7 times that of non-Black Brazilians — while killings by the police more than quadrupled in a decade.

The Mortality Information System (SIM), run by the Ministry of Health, records the official cause of every death in Brazil — including age, race, and circumstance of death. The Atlas of Violence, by Ipea and the Brazilian Public Security Forum, organizes those deaths into homicide series by race, sex, and age. SINAN violence reports show the violence that does not kill, and statistics from Rio de Janeiro's Institute of Public Security (ISP) bring the police record, month by month. Together they sketch a lethal violence that fell over the last decade but remains young, Black, and concentrated in the Northeast.

Firearm deaths: half the victims are under 30

In 2024, 27,423 people were murdered with firearms in Brazil — more than two out of three of the 39,946 homicides recorded in SIM. More than half of those victims, 14,426, were between 15 and 29 years old, an age group that makes up just over a fifth of the population.

Homicides and firearm homicides, with the share of 15-to-29-year-olds (SIM, 2024)
BreakdownDeaths%
Homicides, all means (ICD-10 X85–Y09)39,946100%
By firearm (X93–X95)27,42368.6% of homicides
By firearm, victims aged 15 to 2914,42652.6% of firearm homicides

More than half of those shot dead in Brazil are between 15 and 29 — Brazilian lethal violence has, above all, an age.

Firearms and race: eight in ten victims are Black

An earlier version of this page read SIM's race codes swapped — code 4 is mixed-race (parda), not white — and concluded that white people died more from firearms than mixed-race people. The correct reading shows the opposite. In 2024, 79% of firearm homicide victims were Black or mixed-race, and 19% were white. Black victims are also younger: an average age of 30, against 33 among white victims.

Firearm homicides (ICD-10 X93–X95), by race/color of the victim (SIM, 2024)
Race/colorDeaths% of totalAverage age
Mixed-race (parda)19,25870.2%30.5 years
White5,21619.0%33.4 years
Black (preta)2,4949.1%30.4 years
Asian, Indigenous and unknown4551.7%—
Total27,423100%—

Eight in ten people shot dead in Brazil are Black or mixed-race — armed violence has a color, and an age.

COVID-19 killed more than all lethal violence combined

In 2021, the pandemic killed 424,461 Brazilians — almost three times the 149,322 deaths from all external causes combined: homicides, traffic accidents, suicides, falls, and drownings. Even in a country with alarming rates of lethal violence, a health crisis surpassed in a single year what violent and accidental deaths add up to in almost three.

Deaths from COVID-19 versus deaths from external causes (SIM, 2021)
CauseDeaths
COVID-19 (ICD-10 B34.2)424,461
All external causes (V01–Y98)149,322

COVID-19 killed almost three times as many people as all external causes of death combined in 2021 — the country's greatest recent mortality tragedy did not come from a gun.

Where killing is highest: the Northeast at the top, São Paulo at the bottom

The homicide rate per 100,000 residents, counted by the victim's state of residence, maps lethal violence in 2024. Pernambuco, Alagoas, Ceará, and Bahia exceed 32 per 100,000 — almost double the national average of 18.6 for assault (the Atlas of Violence, which also adds deaths from legal intervention, reaches 20.0). São Paulo, at 6.1, and Santa Catarina, at 7.5, have the lowest rates: a resident of Pernambuco runs six times the risk of being murdered as a resident of São Paulo.

Assault homicides (ICD-10 X85–Y09) per 100,000 residents, by state of residence (SIM and IBGE, 2024)
StateDeathsRate per 100,000
Pernambuco3,44736.1
Alagoas1,14635.6
Ceará3,15234.1
Bahia4,86132.7
Amapá25732.0
Brazil (victims with identified municipality of residence)39,50618.6
Federal District2939.8
Santa Catarina6087.5
São Paulo2,7946.1

Living in Pernambuco means six times the risk of being murdered of living in São Paulo.

SINAN: 616,000 violence reports in one year

SINAN's mandatory violence reports, filled in by the health services that treat the victim, show the violence that does not always kill. In 2024 there were 616,548 reports — more than triple the 198,113 of 2014. Seven in ten victims (71%) were women, and two thirds of cases (68%) happened at home. A report can flag more than one type of violence: physical violence appears in almost half, and self-harm, which includes suicide attempts, in almost a third.

Violence reports by type (SINAN, 2024; a case can have more than one type)
TypeReports% of reports
Physical290,22847.1%
Self-harm189,92630.8%
Psychological112,30218.2%
Sexual83,16313.5%
Neglect or abandonment74,76812.1%
Total reports616,548—

Seven in ten reported victims are women, and two thirds of the violence happens at home — home remains the most dangerous place for many Brazilian women.

Police lethality: killings by the police more than quadrupled

SIM records deaths caused by state agents as legal intervention. There were 592 in 2013; in 2024 there were 2,644 — more than four times as many, in a decade when homicides overall fell by a quarter. The rate rose from 0.3 to 1.2 per 100,000 residents, according to the Atlas of Violence. Of the 2024 victims, 79% were Black or mixed-race (2,094 of 2,644). An earlier version of this page claimed that a young Black man had eight times the risk of a young white man of being killed by the police; the figure had no verifiable source and was removed.

Deaths from legal intervention in Brazil (SIM, via the Atlas of Violence)
YearDeathsRate per 100,000
20135920.3
20182,0421.0
20222,0421.0
20232,3041.1
20242,6441.2

In a decade when homicides fell by a quarter, killings by the police more than quadrupled — and four in five victims are Black.

Rio de Janeiro: when the police account for a third of violent deaths

Statistics from Rio de Janeiro's Institute of Public Security (ISP), the country's longest state series of police records, add up intentional homicide, robbery-homicide, bodily injury followed by death, and death from intervention by a state agent into lethal violence. It fell from 7,699 victims in 2007 to 3,892 in 2025. The police's share swung widely: from 7.8% of violent deaths in 2013 to 30.3% in 2019, the peak of the series, when 1,814 people were killed by state agents. In 2025 there were 800 — one in five violent deaths in the state.

Lethal violence and deaths from intervention by state agents in Rio de Janeiro (ISP)
YearLethal violenceKilled by policePolice share
20077,6991,33017.3%
20135,3484167.8%
20195,9801,81430.3%
20224,4851,33029.7%
20243,80970318.5%
20253,89280020.6%

In 2019, almost one in three violent deaths in Rio de Janeiro was caused by the police — and the drop that followed shows the number responds to public-security policy decisions.

Homicides falling — and the ones that vanish from the statistics

According to SIM records compiled in the Atlas of Violence, homicides fell from 57,396 in 2013 (a rate of 28.8 per 100,000) to 42,590 in 2024 (20.0). Part of the drop, however, is a recording effect: the Atlas estimates hidden homicides, violent deaths filed with an undetermined cause that, given the profile of the victim and the incident, were murders. In 2023 there were 3,755, raising the 45,747 recorded homicides to 49,502 estimated.

Recorded, hidden, and estimated homicides (Atlas of Violence)
YearRecordedRate per 100,000HiddenEstimated
201357,39628.83,47960,875
201857,95628.15,23863,194
202246,40922.05,98252,391
202345,74721.63,75549,502
202442,59020.0——

Homicides fell by a quarter in a decade, but every year thousands of murders enter the statistics as deaths of undetermined cause.

Lethal violence against LGBTQI+ people: the data the state does not collect

Neither SIM nor police reports record the sexual orientation or gender identity of homicide victims. SINAN's violence report form has both fields — in 2024 it recorded 9,295 travesti or transgender victims and 18,478 gay, lesbian, or bisexual victims — but it covers violence treated by health services, not murders. For homicides, the only continuous national count is produced by a civil society organisation, Grupo Gay da Bahia, from press and social media reports, and therefore measures reported homicides, not homicides that occurred: a floor, not a total. With that caveat, the series peaks at 445 deaths in 2017 and falls to 329 in 2019. The breakdown by group exposes the harshest disproportion: in 2020, trans and travesti people accounted for 164 of identified deaths against 51 gay men — an inversion of 2019, when gay men were 52.9% and trans/travesti people 36.8%. Whether the shift reflects a real displacement of violence or improved victim identification is indistinguishable with the available data, which is itself the finding: the absence of state collection makes it impossible to separate trend from artefact.

Reported LGBTQI+ homicides in Brazil (Grupo Gay da Bahia)
YearTotal reportedNote
2013314—
2015319—
2017445series peak
2018420—
2019329gay men 52.9%; trans/travesti 36.8%
2020—trans/travesti 164 against 51 gay men

Brazil has no official statistic on LGBTQI+ homicide — the only national figure comes from an NGO reading newspapers, which means every unreported death is invisible to public policy.

Powerful cross-references

Explanatory hypotheses

Firearm violence can be explained by ease of access: Brazil has one of the largest per-capita fleets of firearms in circulation in the world, legal and illegal. The concentration of deaths among young Black and mixed-race people points to the overlap of urban poverty, territorial segregation, and a confrontation-based security policy. Minimal-state theory helps explain the persistence of ineffective security policies in vulnerable areas. And the predominance of domestic violence as the leading cause of reports reveals that, for many Brazilian women and children, the most immediate danger is inside the home, not on the street.

Policy implications

Effective disarmament, with real enforcement of the flow of weapons, has the potential to measurably reduce lethal violence. Arms control in cooperation with Mercosur countries could reduce the cross-border flow of illegal weapons. Preventing COVID-19 deaths among poor populations requires specific, not just generic, health policies. Women's assistance units need to be expanded, with 24-hour operation, across the entire territory. Community policing in areas currently without state presence could reduce lethality in those territories. And urban disarmament policies remain urgent in the face of a number that shouldn't be normalized: firearms kill more than 27,000 people a year in the country.